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THE THEORY OF INTERNATIONAL VALUES. 
I. 
INTERNATIONAL  trade meaning in plain English trade between 
nations, it is not  surprising that the term should  mean  some- 
thing else in Political Economy.  In  technical usage international 
is  distinguished  from  home  trade  by the  existence  of  barriers 
which prevent owners of  the means of  production  in one  region 
-or,  more  generally,  sphere  of  industry-from  employing 
those means in another sphere.l  Or is it easier to say that home 
trade is distinguished from international by the tendency to equal 
remuneration  of  efforts and sacrifices : to an equality of  profits, 
and an equation of  the net advantages in different occupations ? 
The general conditions which determine equilibrium are the same 
for both  species of  trade ; the only difference is that in the case 
of  the home trade there are one or two more equations. 
Such is I  think the essential attributeqf the term international 
trade as used  by theoretical  economists ; the properties of  geo- 
graphical  and  political  separation,  though  usually understood, 
are not those from which the principal conclusions flow. 
The flexibility of  this definition  escapes  from the  objection 
that there  is  no  difference  in'the  present  age  between  inter- 
national and domestic trade.  Let it be granted that capital and 
perhaps  business  power  is free to flow to all parts of  the earth.3 
Yet labour cannot be conceived as flowing so freely.  The wdrld 
is not  yet  in the condition of  the American colonies where, if 
Virginia  damnified  Maryland  by a  tax, it  is  said  that  the in- 
1 ' The immobility of industrial agents,' as Professor Bastable says, in his adlhir- 
able discussion of  the definition in question.-InterNational  Trade, ch. 1. 
2  The plan of  putting international before  domestic trade-treating  it as the rule 
rather than as an exception-may  have historical as well as theoretical justification, 
if  we  agree with Professor Bastable that '  the first exchanges were  international  (or 
rather intertribal).' 
3 Business power at least, if  not labour, has in several cases been transferred from 
England to foreign countries, in  order to avoid hostile tariffs.  See Diplomatic and 
Consular Reports, Spain 1893, C 6855, 112, p. 18.  I have heard  of  other  instances 
consequent on the McKinley Tariff. 
Commerce of  Nations, p.  7. 
D2 36  THE  ECONOMIC JOURNAL 
habitant of  Maryland would transfer himself  to Virginia.l  Pre- 
sumably there  may be  a  considerable  difference  in the level  of 
advantage  in different  countries before labour flows from one to 
another.2  Suppose, however, that the conditions of  international 
trade proper ceased to exist,  there would still remain the quasi- 
international  trade  between the parties  to Distribution.  There 
would  still  be  a  great gulf  between  employers  and  employed 
across  which  work  is  transported  in  exchange  for  finished 
products. 
According  to  this view  the fundamental  principle  of  inter- 
national  trade  is  that  general  theory  which  Jevons  called  the 
Theory of  Exchange, and Prof. Marshall describes as ‘  an inquiry 
into the balancing of  the forces of  Demand and Su~ply,’~  which 
constitutes  ‘the kernel’  of  most  of  the  chief  problems  of 
economics.  It is a corollary of  the general  theory that  all  the 
parties to a bargain look to gain by it.  Foreign trade would  not 
go  on  unless it seemed less  costly to each of  the parties to it to 
obtain  imports  in exchange for exports than to produce them at 
home.  This is  the  generalised  statement of  the principle  of 
Comparative  Cost, with respect to its positive part at least.  The 
negative  clause, that the value  of  articles in the international 
market is not proportioned to the cost-the  ‘  efforts and sacrifice’ 
-incurred  by the respective producers, is  superfluous, if  the defini- 
tion here proposed  is adopted.  Why should there be  any corre- 
spondence between cost and value in the absence of  the conditions, 
proper to domestic trade, on which that equality depends ? 
In a  complete  treatise  on  international  trade  it would  be 
proper  to  dwell  at length both on  the general principle and the 
,corollary ;  on the one hand contemplating the tendency towards 
maximum satisfaction:  which constitutes the grandest generalisa- 
tion of  Economics ; and on the other hand applying the doctrine 
of  Comparative  Cost  to  explain  the  peculiarities  of  existing 
commerce-why  such and such  articles  are  exported  from one 
-country and imported to an~ther.~ 
1 Quarterly Journal of  Economics, October 1892. 
Principles, Book V. ch. 111. 
4 The principle is employed by almost all mathematical writers on economics ; 
,among whom  Professor  Marshall  may  be  distinguished  as stating  carefully the 
limitations, under the existing social regime, of the ‘  doctrine of  maximum satisfac- 
tion ’ (Pri?zciples of  Economics, Book V. ch. 12, § 7) ;  and Dr. Irving Fisher as appre- 
ciating the mysterious analogies between the maximum principles in physics and in 
human affairs.  (‘ Mathematical Investigations in the Theory of  Value and Prices.’ 
From Transactions of  the Connecticut Academy, Vol. IX., July 1892). 
As Professor Taussig has done in his brilliant  article on ‘  Aspects of  the Tariff 
$Question,’  in the Quarterly Journal of  Economics for 1889, p. 291. 
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But it is proposed  to confine  this study to those portions of 
the theory which  have  at  once  some  bearing  on practice,  and 
also a  high  degree  of  generality.  I shall  endeavour, in  a  first 
article, to express in as simple language as possible some proposi- 
tions  of  this  double  character.  A  mathematical  version  of 
the  same  propositions  will  form  the  second  part.  The third 
part will  contain a  critical  review  of  the principal  writers  on 
international trade. 
Of  the propositions relating to  international  trade which  are 
at once general and bear on practice the most important, I think, 
are.  those  which  attribute advantage  or detriment-whether  for 
one nation or several-to  changes in the supply of, or demand for, 
articles of  trade.  Such are the answers to the questions : Would 
a tax or  a  bounty, an improvement or deterioration in the means 
of  communication, abundance or scarcity of  an exported  article, 
be  beneficial  to  the home  country, or  to  all  parties?  The 
answers to such questions vary with  the data, which  require to 
be carefully distinguished. 
since  it  is the  similarity,  not  the  difference,  which  generally 
escapes notice-is  that which has been already indicated between 
international  trade proper, relating to separated regions, and the 
analogues  thereof  which  may  be  termed  quasi-international 
trade.  Another distinction, which one might have  a priori sup- 
posed  to  be very obvious, is  between  the  interests of the home 
country and that of  the world  at large.  Yet, strange to say, a 
confusion  between  ideas  so different as part and whole pervades 
many of  the arguments in favour of Free Trade ; the complaints 
of  List  against ‘  the School ’-the  followers of  Adam Smith-on 
this ground are too well founded.2 The equivocation might be com- 
pared to that which it was reserved for Prof. Sidgwick to point out 
in the term Utilitarianism-referring  sometimes to the Greatest 
Happiness of  the individual, and sometimes to that of  the whole. 
One distinction-which  indeed hardly needs to be pointed out, . 
National System. 
2  The amiable confusion between one’s own or one’s country’s exclusive advantage 
and that of  the world at large may be attributed  to  Mr. Gladstone, when  he asks- 
in his article on ‘  Free Trade or Protection,’ in the North American Review,  Vol. el.- 
‘ why, if  Protection is a good thing, it should not be  adopted by the United  States in 
their internal trade. ’ 
Even the most clearheaded of  writers, James Nil1 (Elements  of  Political Economy, 
ch. 111.  16, p.  159, ed. 1821) and Professor Bastable  (International Trade, p. 123, 
and ‘  Incidence and Effects of  Import and Export Duties,’  in the Report of  the British 
Association for 1889, p. 6 of  the essay, p. 446 of  the Report), seem not to distinguish 
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Another  important  distinction  is  between  small  and  large 
changes ; the characteristic of  the latter being such an alteration 
in the scale  of  production  that  the law of  increasing returns is 
brought  into operation  [or  the converse alteration].  Thus the 
' improvement '  in  the  process  of  manufacture of  an exported 
article considered by Mill in his great chapter (Bk. 111. ch. 18  5.5) 
is presumably of  the order ' small ' ; the change contemplated by 
him in  an earlier  section (s 2)) from  a time '  when each country 
produced  both  commodities to  an established  trade,'  may  well 
be-but  is  not  necessarily-large.  Another  distinction  to 
which  it  is proper  to call attention is between  an impediment 
to trade  [or  an  improvement]  in  general  and  that  particular 
kind of  obstruction [or  encouragement] which a tax [or  bounty] 
constitutes.  The proceeds which may accrue from a tax form an 
item which  is  sometimes  left  out  of  account  in the balance of 
advant  ages.l 
0  ther  principles  of  classification requiring  no comment  are 
the distinction between changes originating in the home country, 
or abroad ;  between those affecting primarily exports, or imports ; 
between the case of  two countries, and that of  several countries ; 
and so forth. 
It will be sufficient here to select the most instructivk cases ; 
requesting the reader to attend carefully to the issue, and to stay 
condemnation, until  appeal has been  made  to  the  tribunal  of 
mathematical  reasoning. 
The  simplest  case  is  where  the  question  is  whether  the 
advantage of  the home  country is  increased  by an increase  in 
the supply of  foreign articles, in the sense  that the  foreigner  is 
willing to give a greater  quantity of  those  articles  in exchange 
for  any  the  same  quantity  of  native  produce,  the  increase 
being  supposed  to be  on  a  small  scale.2  Upon  the general 
principle  that  a  cheap  market  is  advantageous  to the  buyer, 
the  home  country  is  benefited;  whatever  the cause  of  the 
increased  supply, whether  it is due to-an improvement  in the 
production  of  the foreign  articles,  or  a greater  desire  on  the 
part  of  the foreigners  for  the produce  of  the  home  country, 
or  ceteris paribus  an increase  in  their  numbers.  Conversely 
Thus  the  project  of  a  differential  tax on foreign  produce  (in favour  of  the 
colonies) is described by an eminent free-trader as a demand that '  England  should 
tax herself  to the amount of  105 millions '  ;  as if  England would be  a  loser  to that 
extent.  In  the view which I adopt the amount received by  the Government is to be 
set against the amount paid by the people. 
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a diminution in the supply of  foreign goods  is detrimental to the 
home country. 
The technical use of  the term increase  of  supply must  here 
be  kept in mind.  It  is  quite  possible that  the home  country 
might suffer by the foreign  customer  becoming  better  supplied 
with commodities in general.  It is well observed by Mr. Medley, 
an ardent  free-trader,  that  the adoption  of  free  trade  by  all 
nations-which  of  course, according to him, implies the increase 
of  their  wealth-might  prove  detrimental  to England:  The 
poverty of  the foreigner may quite conceivably be  advantageous 
to the native. 
Suppose  a  new  country exchanging  with  an old  one  food 
for highly manufactured  products.  An  increased  deficiency in 
necessaries  on the part of  the old country, or  of  a large  section 
thereofj2  always supposing-perhaps  an imaginary supposition 3- 
that their efficiency is not thereby impaired, rendering them more 
eager for the supplies derived  from  the new  country,  is apt to 
benefit the new country considered as a whole.  However, the par- 
ticular  section  of  the  home  country  which  supplies  services 
analogous to  those of  the foreigner-considered  as an isolated 
group-may  well be prejudiced by the poverty of  foreign labour. 
This last  consideration  suggests  a fresh topic-international 
competition ; which may however be subordinated to the present 
one (the change in the supply of  foreign goods) by observing that 
when a competitor with the home country deals with the foreigner, 
the ‘ supply ’ of  foreign goods is diminished.  Formal reasoning 
and common sense concur  in regarding  such  competition  as an 
evil to the home ~ountry.~ 
’ 
The  solution  is not  so  simple  when  we  consider  changes 
originating on the side of  the home country.  Such changes may 
be divided into two  classes, according  as  they originate  on  the 
side of  supply, or demand : exports, or imports.  Under the former 
Fair Trade Lhnasked. 
Ceteris paribzcs, of  course :  not supposing that, when the real remuneration  of 
the foreign labourers is diminished, that of  his  employer is  increased ; as Mill and 
Cairnes do in effect ; when, discussing the effect on international values of  low wages 
in a foreign country, they  use  wages  in the peculiar  Ricardian  sense (Pol. Ecoh., 
Book 111. ch. 25,  5 4 and Leading PrincipZcs).  These passages will be discussed in 
our Part 111. 
Professor Walker  in his  powerful  and  impartial  article on  ‘Protection and 
Protectionists ’ in the-Quarterly Journal of  Economics for April 1890,  admits it to be 
quite possible that in some branches of  American industry ‘  the manufacturers pay 
higher wages for a given quantity of  labour than are paid abroad.’ 
Mill’s paradoxically low estimate of  this evil will  be  considered 
in Part 111. 
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head the simplest case is where there has occurred  an  improve- 
ment [or the reverse], a diminution [or increase], in the cost of  pro- 
duction of  an exported article ; the case considered by Mill in the 
fifth section of  his great chapter on International Values.  As may 
be gathered from  Mill’s reasoning,  the improvement  may prove 
detrimental  to  the  exporting  c0untry.l  It is  true that  Mill 
obscures the subject  by  taking as the  measure  of  the  gain  of 
trade  the  alteration in  the  rate of  exchange  between  exports 
and imports rather than the truer measure  of  advantage  which 
the principles of  Consumers’ and Producers’ Rent afford.  How- 
ever, a representative case may be put which  brings out  the im- 
plication latent in Mill’s reasoning.  It  will  be  recollected  that 
Mill supposes an improvement in the production  of  linen  which 
Germany exchanges for cloth imported from England ;  in  which 
case he shows it to be  a  possibility that ‘  Germany will  obtain 
cloth  on  more  unfavourable  terms  and  at a  higher  exchange 
value than before ’ (loc. cit. 5 5,  par. 6).  Now suppose that the 
same amount of  productive forces are expended  on  linen  by the 
German manufacturer before  as after the improvement.  If  the 
increase in productivity has been ten per cent., where before there 
were 100 units of  linen produced, there are  now 110 units  pro- 
duced.  But if  the demand for linen be increased ‘  in a less pro- 
portion than the cheapness,’ whereas the German used to receive, 
say,  100 units of  cloth,  he  will  now  receive  less  than  100. 
For an equal outlay  in the way  of  cost he  receives  a  less  re- 
turn.  Whence  it follows, if  we  make  the  further  supposition 
that  linen  is  not  an  article  of  German  consumption, that the 
exporting  country  is  damnified  by  the  improvement ; and  by 
parity of  reasoning  may be  benefited  by  a  restriction  of  its 
exports.  It  is clear  that the data  which  have  been  supposed 
may  be  considerably  modified  without  the  conclusion  being 
destroyed. 
But indeed, without invoking  Mill’s  stupendous chapter, the 
proposition  is sufficiently supported by common  sense.  It is  a 
commonplace  that  a  bad  harvest  is  good  for  farmers  in the 
absence of  foreign competition.  As Ricardo says, ‘  if  we lived in 
one of  Mr. Owen’s parallelograms and enjoyed all our productions 
in common, then no one could suffer in consequence of  abundance ; 
but as long as society is constituted  as it now is, abundance will 
often be injurious to producers, and scarcity beneficial to them.’ 
1 This view and some others here adopted seem to differ from those of  an eminent 
living economist, whose writings on International Trade will be noticed in the third 
part of  this study.  2  PTotection to Agriculture,  4,  sub fin. THE THEORY  OF INTERNATIONAL  VALUES  41 
Let  us  assume,  according  to  Gregory  King’s  law,l  that  a 
deficiency  in  quantity by  a  tenth may ,raise the value  of  the 
harvest by three-tenths.  Now, suppose that the harvest has been 
an average one ; but that, as the grain is sent to market, a tenth 
leaks out, or  is intercepted  by  robbers  (to use a  favourite free 
trade metaphor).  The total value will  be, as before, raised ; so 
beneficent  (to one party) may be the effect  of  what  Cherbuliez 
calls artificial dearth.2 
An  example of  an impediment  to export, other than a  tax 
accruing to the exporting country, is a transit duty levied on the 
exports from one country to another by a third party.  It is con- 
ceivable  that  the  native  states of  India  might  be  benefited 
by  the  duty  which  we  levy  on  opium  passing  through  our 
territory, if  China had no other means of  satisfying her demand 
for opium. 
A similar effect might be produced by an increase in the cost 
of  transporting the exported  article from the locality of  its pro- 
duction to the port,  supposing that there is no corresponding 
drag on imp~rtation.~ 
The effect of  a variation in the cost of  transport generally will 
be compounded of  different tendencies : since an impediment on 
exportation and on importation in general affects both countries, 
so far as each  both  exports  and  (in  return voyages)  imports. 
Since, out  of  the four tendencies thus compounded, one  only 
(variation in the cost  of  exportation  by natives)-and  that  one 
only  on  certain  conditions-would  lead  to a  benefit  for  the 
natives  from an aggravation of  the cost of  transport, it may be 
presumed that in general such an aggravation is very unlikely to 
be advantageous to the home country. 
of  an article which is both exported  and  consumed at home, is 
also  a  compound  between  the certain  gain  to the native  con- 
sumer and the possible  loss to the home  country in the way of 
foreign trade.  It is quite possible that the latter tendency may 
prevail over the former, just as in the case  of  farmers5  who may 
gain more as producers,  than they lose  as consumers, by a  bad  , 
harvest. 
An instructive example of  the principle  under  consideration 
The case of  an improvement in the process of  manufacture 
See Jevons’ Theqry, p.  168. 
Dictwnnaire  d’Economie politique.  Art.  6 Disette.’ 
AS might well occur in a round-about trade. 
Mill, Pol. Ecoa., ch. 18, 
Above, p. 40. 
2nd edition. 
Cf.  Art. ‘  Abondance,’ by 
Bastiat. 
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is afforded by the question whether a diminution  of  the output 
of  the home country’s exports consequent  upon  a limitation o€ 
working  hours  is  necessarily  injurious  to  the country,  That 
this question is to be answered in the negative is well argued by 
Mr. Sidney Webb in his article on ‘  Limitation of  the Hours of 
Labour ’ in the Co?ztempora.ry  Review for December 1889.1  It is 
noticeable  that the advocate  of  socialistic  measures  dwells  on 
propositions relating to the trade between  two  nations ; he  does 
not  bring  on  the  scene  a  third  country  competing  with  the 
socialistic one.  An  advocate on the other side would  probably 
represent the whole argument as vitiated  by this omission.  The 
judicial  position  is  intermediate  between  these  two.  If  the 
demand  of  the  foreign  customer  for  our  goods,  prior  to,  or 
abstracted from, the existence of  a competing country, is such as 
to  render  a  restriction  of  exports  advantageous  to  the home 
country, it may still be possible, notwithstanding the existence of 
competition, to obtain  that  sort  of  advantage  though  in a less 
degree.  As  Professor  Marshall  says  with  reference  to  this 
question,  ‘ the  influence  of  foreign  trade  competition  in  this 
connection  can  be  proved  to be  different  from what  it  at first 
sight appears. ’ 
It  should  not  be  conceived,  I  think,  that  the  conditions 
favouring  the  successful  restriction  of  exports  are  altogether 
exceptional.  Mill, after  distinguishing  three varieties  of  condi- 
tions  inquires  ‘which is  the  more  probable,’  and  decides  in 
favour of  that variety which, as we  have already seen, is favour- 
able  to the policy  of  restriction.4  Accordingly,  if  each  nation 
could  only deal with  one  other, either  of  the pair  might  often 
play the game of  restriction with  advantage.  But no  doubt the 
existence of  competition modifies  the foreigner’s law of  demand 
for the native articles in such wise  as to render that game much 
less gainful. 
It  is  to  be  observed  that  the  advantage  which  has  been 
described  results  from  a  drag on exports which  need not  be  a 
tax.  A fortiori of  course when the impediment is a tax accruing 
to the exporting country.  The latter  proposition  is much more 
generally  accepted,  I  think,  than  the  f~rmer.~  It  is  often 
stated with  the unnecessary  limitation  that  the home  country 
See p. 878, Vol. LVI. 
Pol. Econ., Book 111, ch. 18, J 5 last par. 
Cf.  Ante, p.  39. 
The latter is explicitly admitted even by McCulloch ; the former  not  even by 
Principles, 2nd edition, p.  745, note. 
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must have an absolute moiiopoly of  the exporting artic1e.l  That 
she  should  furnish  a  considerable  portion  of  the total supply 
might  suffice. 
Coming  next  to  changes  originated  on  the side of  imports 
(to the home country), let us consider a restriction on importation 
such as a transit duty imposed  by a third power on imports into 
the home country,  Such an impediment on imports, unlike one 
on exports, is never advantageous to the home country.2  The duty 
levied by the Indian Government on opium  transported  through 
Bombay from  the Native States might conceivably benefit those 
States, but not the Chinese. 
A  tax indeed on imports the proceeds of  which accrue to the 
home  country may be  beneficial  to that country : but not in SO 
many cases, not  with  as great  probability, as a  tax on exports. 
The positive part of  this statement is proved by Mill ;  but the 
negative part is less easy to establish by the  purely literary method. 
A  sense  of  this difference between  the effect of  a tax on ex- 
ports  and  one  on imports is perhaps traceable in the division  of 
opinion  with  regard  to  the question whether  a tax on imports 
can  fall  on  the  foreigner-a  division  of  opinion  greater  than 
exists  with  regard  to  the  corresponding question  concerning 
 export^.^  That a  tax on imports may prove a  net  gain  to the 
home  country is admitted  by the Xapievreq, but  it  is denied by 
the common free-trader and even by competent economists when 
expressing themselves  carelessly.  It  may be as well  to adduce 
instances  of  these  contrary judgments ; so  that  my argument 
in favour  of  the proposition  in  question may  appear  neither 
paradoxical nor otiose. 
In favour  of  the proposition  the following high  authorities 
may be cited :-Mill  (Political  Economy,  bk. v. ch iv. 5 6). 
‘A tax  on  imported  commodities  almost  always  falls  in  part 
upon  the  foreigners.’ . . . .  Those  are  in  the right  who maintain 
that taxes on imports are partly paid by foreigners.’ 
0 
Senior.  (Outlines,  184). 
‘  A part of  the taxes received by the Government of  one country is 
often paid by the inhabitants of  another.’ 
E.g.  Rogers, Six Centuries, p.  79, ‘ there must be no other source of  supply.’ 
For  the  evidence  of  this  asymmetry  I  must  refer  to  the  forthcoming 
Pol. Eeon., Book V.  ch. 4,  $ 6,  passages quoted below, p.  47. 
McCulloch, for instance, admits  the latter, but  denies the former (Prilzciples 
Part 11. 
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Seligman (Incidertce of  Tuxution, ch v.). 
( It  will  be  seen how erroneous is the doctrine of  those extremists 
who maintain that the loss to the consumer is measured by the proceeds 
of  the import duties.’ . . . ‘  The price of  Sumatra tobacco has risen by 
only a fraction of  the tax.’ 
Compare  the admissions  made  by Professor Bastable in his 
paper  on ‘ Incidence and Effects of  Taxation ’ so often  referred 
to, and Professor Nicholson’s reasoning in his masterly paper on 
‘ Tariffs and International Commerce.’ 
On the other side Mongredien (Pleas  for Protection. Exunzined):: 
the  ‘Import  duties  on  foreign  goods  fall on  the  consumers  of 
importing country and are paid by them.’ 
Sydney Buxton (A.B.C. of Free Trade) : 
‘  Duties on  goods are paid  for  by the people  who  consume those 
goods, and not by the people who produce them.’ 
Sir J. Lubbock at the Congress of  the Chambers of  Commerce 
of  the Empire, 1892, says, ‘  I maintain the proposition that the 
duties are paid by the’  consumer.’  (Chumber  of Commerce Journul, 
July, 1892, Supplememt, p. 28.) 
Mr. McKinley 
(North American Review, el. p. 742) writes- 
consumer in the United States will pay every dollar of  that tax.’ 
The opinion is not confined to Free-Traders. 
(If  the  duty  is  put  on  the  non-competing foreign  products, the 
An instructive statement of  the common free trade opinion is 
found  in Mr. Strachey’s singularly  brilliant  report on the effect 
of  the  German  tariff  (Parl.  Papers,  1884-6,  LXXXI.).  Mr. 
Strachey speaks of 
‘  The axiom of  political economy that a tax on foreign commodities 
is borne by the  importing country.  No one could so much  as state 
[the  contrary] without  exposing  himself  to the charge of  having  no 
sense of  humour.’ 
No one certainly will bring this charge against Mr. Strachey; for 
his report is probably the wittiest blue-book in existence ;  one of 
the wisest too, if  we except this particular passage.  Mr. Strachey 
seems to himself to have proved his case when he has demonstrated 
-by  some very interesting statistics-that  the price of  the taxed 
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article in the importing country exceeds its price in the exporting 
country by just  the amount of  the tax, abstracting cost of  trans- 
port.  But quis  dubitavit ? If, as is or was recently the case, there 
is a tax of  two dollars per ton on hay imported from Canada into 
the United States, the cost of  transport being here  insignificant, 
the price per ton on the American  side of  the frontier  will  be 
two dollars higher than on the Canadian side.  The question  is 
whether it is the American price that has gone up, or the Canadian 
price  which  has  gone  down.  The  latter  happens  to  be  the 
case.l 
A  similar  ignoratio elemchi  is  committed  by  a  still higher 
authority, Roscher, when he argues that Germany must pay the 
full amount of  the tax which  she  imposed  on wheat  imported 
from America;  for  that the price  in Germany  (account being 
taken of  cost of  transport) exceeds that in England by exactly the 
amount of  the tax.2  But how does he know that the imposition 
of the tax did not cause America to offer her  wheat to England 
on better  terms  than  before?  It  may be  the  American price 
which  has  gone  down,  not  the  German  price  which  has 
gone  up.3 
Probably the highest  authority  and  weightiest  argument in 
favour of  the proposition in question are those of  WCulloch, who 
holds * that the project [of  obliging foreigners to contribute to the 
revenue of  the nation] ‘  is wholly imaginary, and that duties  on 
imports are always paid by the importers,  and never  by the ex- 
porters ’ ; the  reason being  that the exporters must obtain  the 
rate of  profits prevailing in their  country, and  therefore  cannot 
after  the tax lower  the  price  which  before  the tax only  just 
afforded the ordinary  profit^.^ 
1 As  shown  in  the Report  of  the Subcommittee  of  the Committee of  Finance 
(Senate U.S.) by Senator Merrill (Rep. 788). Here are some extracts from the evidence : 
‘  The duty of  five cents per dozen imposed upon eggs by the McKinley tariff  is paid 
by the foreign producer not by the consumer.’ . . ‘  They have dropped the valuation 
on most  farm products  just about the amount of  the duty imposed by the McKinley 
bill.’ . . . ‘  No question they have to take 30 per cent. less for their horses.’ 
Mr. Edward Atkinson in his comments on this Report (Taxation and  Work, oh. 
xxv.), after  ridiculing the ‘delusion  that one of  the effects of  a  duty imposed in 
this country upon a given import is to depress the price of  that article in the country 
in which it is produced, and that by such reduction  the burden  of  our tax is put 
upon  that country ’  (p.  193) admits (p.  194), that ‘  our duties upon  the products of 
Canada have unquestionably had that effect.’ 
2  Finamwissenschaft, p.  411, Note 4. 
4  Prhiples of  Political Economy, Part I.,  oh. v.,  sub &em.  Cf. Taxation and 
5 McCulloch’s argument is employed by  Mongredien (Pleas for  Protection) and 
Let us examine this reason. 
3 Cf. Bastable, Incidence, p.  3. 
Funding, Part II., ch.  V. 
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First, as pointed out by Prof. Bastable,l price may be lowered 
without profits being diminished, if the cost of  production varies 
with the margin.  Thus a tax imposed by the United  States on 
certain  kinds  of  agricultural produce  imported  from  Canada 
might  result in the diminution of  the quantity, the cost of  pro- 
duction, and the  price of  that produce.  This idea of  a freely sliding 
margin is indeed highly  theoretical, but so is the objector’s idea 
of  equal profits in all occupations. 
More important in practice, if  less familiar in theory,  is the 
analogous case in which the burden falls-not  on rent proper- 
but on ‘  quasi-rent.’  Suppose an import tax laid  on tin plates. 
The tax might  be  paid  out  of  the  surplus gains  of  the  more 
successful foreign manufacturers,3 while the less successful would 
be driven out of  the field. 
No doubt if  the tax imposed  were  a very heavy  one, such as 
is now fashionable, say 50 or a 100 per  cent., it is not to be  ex- 
pected that the foreign exporters should lower their price to that 
extent.  The  price  of  tin  plates  then  will  rise  in  the  home 
country. 
price appears to be inflicted on the home country.  But it appears 
so only while  we  confine  our  attention  to  immediate  effects. 
When an engine pushes  against a  carriage the immediate effect 
is that the buffer of  the carriage is pressed back.  When the biiffer 
has been  pressed  back  to a  certain  point  the  carriage  begins 
to  move,  and  the  buffer  of  the  next  carriage,  and  in  fine 
the  whole  train.  The propagated  influence  of  a  tax may  be 
similar,  in a  case  where  the  demand  of  the foreigner for the 
products  of  the home country-say  food  and raw materials-is 
very  urgent.  The  export  of  tin  plates  being  checked,  the 
foreigners find a difficulty in paying  for the imports which they 
so much  require.  To restore the equation of  international trade 
they are constrained to offer their exports other than tin plates- 
exports in general-on  terms less  favourable to themselves.  It 
is quite conceivable that the gain which the home country derives 
from this readjustment  of  trade may exceed  the loss which  it 
derives from the rise of  the value of  tin plates.  As  Mill says in 
his splendid  and candid  section  on  Protectionism : ‘  A  country 
which  prohibits  some foreign commodities does, ceteris paribus, 
obtain those which  it does not  prohibit  at a less  price  than it 
would otherwise have to pay.’ 
1 Incidence p.  3, Cf.  International Trade p.  45.  See  also Sidgwick, Pol.  Econ., 
3  See Bastable, Incidence and Effects, [Report of  the British Association for 18891, 
Accordingly a  net loss  corresponding  to  that rise  of  . 
Book 111.  ch. V.  9 3. 
and Sidgwick, Pol.  Econ., Book 111.  oh. V. 
2  Above,  p. 45. 
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An import tax in the case supposed would resemble the export 
tax before  considered, in tending  to check the exports from the 
home  country.  For a  country  so  circumstanced  it  might  be 
disadvantageous to '  grow more cotton and cereals,'  as Mr. Glad- 
stone  recommends  the  Americans.2  How  should  the  native 
labour, which  but  for  the  check to  exports  would  have  been 
employed in producing them, be  now  most  advantageously em- 
ployed ?  Quite possibly on '  tin plates ' ; thereby rendering  the 
native  demand  for  foreign  goods  less  pressing, and thus more 
fully satisfying the conditions which must exist in order that the 
foreigner may be taxed. 
These arguments are not affected, or rather become a fortiori, 
by the existence of '  invisible ' exports or imports of  the nature of 
capital lent, or interest paid.  For by the operations which have 
been  described  the value  of  money will  have  been  increased in 
the foreign country and decreased in the home ~ountry.~  Accord- 
ingly the natives as lenders or debtors will now have to give less 
of  their own produce, and as borrowers  or creditors will  receive 
more of  the foreigner's produce. 
It  has been  shown that under  conceivable  circumstances ad- 
vantage may result to the home country from a tax on exports or 
imports.  But  will  it  result  under  given  circumstances?  A 
negative  answer, I think, may be  given in some concrete cases ; 
in many '  the only answer is that an answer is impossible ' ; as 
Professor J. S. Nicholson demonstrates in his essay on '  Tariffs and 
International Commerce.'  The afirmative  answer  is described 
by him as '  part of  the casuistry of  economics,' like the discussions 
of  moral philosophers  concerning the occasional  justification of 
mendacity.  '  Free  trade,  like  honesty,  still  remains,  the  best 
policy.' 
This analogy seems singularly  just  to  one  who  agrees  with 
Mill as a poralist that '  even  this rule  [truth], sacred  as it is, 
admits of  possible exception ' . . . . that '  the exception  ought to 
be  recognised,  and,  if  possible, its  limits  defined ' ;  and  with 
Mill as an economist, that in particular cases '  taxes on imports 
Cf.  F. Bowen, Principles of  Political Economy, p. 467,  at sqq. 
2  In his article on '  Free Trade and Protection,' in the North American Review. 
See Mr. Blaine's criticism of  his advice.  Ibid. 
2.  Mill, Pol.  Econ.,  penultimate 
par.,  subsnem, Bk.  V.  ch.  IV. §  6,  par.  4, latter part.  Bastable, International 
Trade, ch. III., and p.  118. 
In the Scottish Geographical  Magazine for September, 1891. 
L'filifavinnisvz, ch. I. 
See Ricardo, Pol. Econ., Bk. 111. ch. XXI. 
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are partly paid by foreigners.’  ‘  England  will  gain  at the ex- 
pense  of  Germany not  only the whole amount of  the duty but 
more ’  by an export tax.3 
Bounties  being ‘  negative taxes,’ as Cournot  says, it  might 
have been expected that in cases where  a  tax is detrimental, a 
bounty  would  be  beneficial.  It is not  so however;  a bounty, 
whether on exports or irnport~,~  takes more from the Government 
th‘an it gives to the public ;  SO long as we confine our attention 
to changes which are not organic in the sense already explainede 
But when we consider large changes apt to be  attended with 
a reorganisation of trade, many of  the preceding  propositions no 
longer hold good.  An increased supply, a  greater  cheapness of 
foreign  goods,  may  now, I think,  prove  disadvantageous.7  A 
bounty may prove advantageous upon principles indicated by Prof. 
Marshall,8 by  calling  into  play  the law  of  increasing  returns. 
Upon similar principles, a tax on imports may foster  native in- 
dustries, it may  be  advantageous  in its ulterior  as well  as its 
more immediate  effects; in  the way  of  protection, as well  as 
in the way of  what may be called in a large senseg  revenue. 
I hope it may be allowable to define  my subject so  as to ex- 
clude a detailed examination  of  the  free-trade controversy.  On 
the general issue I have nothing  to  add  to what  I have  learnt 
from the first-rate writers  who  have  treated  of  the  subject,  in 
particular Mill, and Prof. Sidgwick,lo and Prof. Marshall.ll  As I 
read, protection  might  procure  economic  advantage  in certain 
cases,  if  there was a  Government wise  enough  to discriminate 
those cases, and  strong  enough  to  confine  itself  to them ;  but 
this condition is very unlikely to be fulfilled. 
1 Book V.  ch. IV. 1  6. 
3  Of course I agree with Mill and living writers that for one nation to benefit itself 
at the expense of  a greater loss to others is contrary to the highest  morality, which 
takes  the  greatest  happiness  of  all  as. its  end.  ‘The justice  . . . . . of 
destroying one of  two gains in order  to engross a  rather larger  share of  the other 
does not require discussion ’  (Mill, Book V.  ch. X.  1 1). But, in an abstract  study 
upon the motion of  projectiles in vacuo, I do not think it necessary to enlarge upon 
the horrors of  war. 
4  Of which Adam Smith gives instances (Wealth of  Nations, Book IV. ch. 8). 
5 See Part 11. 
7  Once more I can only offer a proleptic reference to  my Part 11. 
8 Principles of  Economics, Book  V. ch. 12. 
9  Including producers’ and consumers’ rent, as well as the receipts of  the Treasury. 
10 pol. Econ. Book 111.  ch. v. ;  and Scope and Method of  Economic Sc%ence. 
11 Presidential Address to Section F.  of  the British Association, Report of  British 
Bid. 
. 
Above, p. 38. 
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So far  we have been regarding  exclusively  the advantage  of 
the home  country.  When we take in the interest of  all parties 
we are met with the axiom that any interference with  exchange 
diminishes the  sum  total of  advantage  resulting  to all parties 
concerned.  The axiom, like most of  the propositions with which 
we are concerned, presents two aspects according as we consider 
small or organic changes.  With reference to the former  case it 
may be accepted without qualification, except so far as the level 
of  utility,  so  to  speak,  is  regarded  as  different  in  different 
countries;  the  exports  of  one  country  as  compared  with 
aeother costing  more  labour,  and  the  imports  exciting  more 
satisfaction. 
When we consider large changes, developing  new  industries, 
it  is conceivable, as Prof.  Sidgwick has argued2 that an inter- 
ference with  the ' natural ' course of  international trade may be 
beneficial to all parties. 
Much of  what has been  hitherto  said refers  primarily to the 
case of  trade between two co~ntries.~  But the transition  to the 
niore  general  case  is >easy.  As  Mill  says, '  trade  among  any 
number  of  countries  must  take  place  on  the  same  essential 
principles  as trade between  two  countries.  . . . Introducing  a 
greater number of  agents precisely similar cannot change the law 
of  their action' (Political Economy, Book III., ch. xviii., 5 3). 
The preceding propositions  relate especially to  international 
trade proper.  But  many  of  them may  be  transferred  to that 
quasi-international  trade  of  which  the principal  example is the 
transaction by which the national produce is divided between the 
.owners of  the agents of  production.  The principal characteristic 
peculiar to international trade proper is, I think, the possibility of 
.a nation benefiting itself by a tax on exports and imports.  There 
may indeed be a tax on the transactions between '  nations ' in the 
generalised  sense-such  as a  tax  on wages-but  the proceeds 
of  the tax would  accrue to the community, not  to one  of  the 
groups. 
It is useful, I think, to contemplate the theory of  distribution 
as analogous to that of  international trade proper.  . It is seen, for 
instance, that the intention which  seems to inspire  some of  the 
leaders  of  labour  to raise  wages  by  restricting  the  supply  of 
-, 
1 Compare Professor Marshall, P&ncipZes,  Book 111. ch. VI. 5 2, par. 3. 
3  It willbe recollected  that the competition of  a  third  country was  treated  as 
Pol. Econ. Part III., ch.v.  § 1. 
affectting the demand of  one of  the two countries ;  above p.  39. 
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labour isprinzGfacie quite consistent with general principles.  But 
a doubt may occur whether the special conditions are favourable 
for carrying such a policy to any great length ; when the trans- 
action between  the entrepreneur and the workman, who supplies 
an agent  of  production  in return for a  share of  the produce, is 
likened to that sort  of  international trade which England  used 
to have with the Southern States of  America, when she imported 
materials (cotton) and exported the finished article. 
Again it is instructive to regard the transaction between land- 
lord and farmer as a  sort of  international ‘trade.  The familiar 
proposition that ‘  rent does not enter into price,’  or  into cost of 
production, may thus be seen in a clearer light.  But this is one 
of  the topics  which may  better be treated in the mathematical 
part which is to follow. 
F. Y. EDGEWORTH 
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